11 is
1. Close to 25% of fatalities on the road are related to alcohol. Correct Answer: B. FalseCorrect!Explanation: Almost 41% of all fatalities are caused by drinking and driving or doing other drugs and driving. 2. Youth who drink before the age of 15 are _________ more likely to develop alcohol dependence, then if they wait until they are 21 years old. Correct Answer: B. 4 TIMESCorrect!Explanation: Youth who drink before age 15 are four times more likely to develop alcohol dependence than those who begin drinking at age 21. (NIAAA, 1997) An early age of drinking onset is associated with alcohol-related violence not only among persons under age 21 but among adults as well. (Hingson et al, October 2001) Research continues to show that young drivers are more often involved in alcohol-related collisions than any other comparable age group (NHTSA, 2001). 3. A DUI/OWI conviction stays on your record for Correct Answer: C. 75 yearsCorrect!Explanation: All DUI/OWI convictions will stay on your record for 75 years. 4. What is dependence Correct Answer: A. When a person stops using drugs and experiences withdrawalsIncorrect!Explanation: Dependence refers to a physical state where when one stops using a drug or alcohol, withdrawal occurs. If a person experiences withdrawal symptoms after discontinuing use of drugs or alcohol, then he or she is dependent on that drug or alcohol. After repeated use of a drug the user s body becomes so accustomed to a particular drug that it can only function normally if the drug is present. 5. A speed sign is an example of a _________ sign Correct Answer: A. RegulatoryCorrect!Explanation: Regulatory signs are white or red signs that regulate the flow of traffic and advise the motorists of any laws for that area. For instance, speed signs are posted in order to keep traffic from moving at an unsafe speed. 6. Good survival strategy for driving includes Correct Answer: C. All optionsCorrect!Explanation: It's important that you know the rules of the road. But simply knowing the rules doesn't make you a safe driver. To become a safe driver you must practice defensive driving techniques. This means perfecting your powers of observation, your traffic safety attitudes, your courtesy to other drivers, your communication abilities and overall driving skills. 7. Having less than one drink can impair your driving. Correct Answer: A. TrueIncorrect!Explanation: There is no safe way to drive after drinking. Even one drink can make you an unsafe driver. Drinking affects your Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC). Remember in Florida it's illegal to drive with a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater. Even a BAC below .08% does not mean that it is safe or legal to do it. 8. At 60 mph the force of your car impacting a surface is about four times as great as 30 mph. Correct Answer: A. TrueCorrect!Explanation: At 60 miles per hour, the force you produce is 4 times greater than at 30 miles per hour. Consider how much roadway you need to stop your car at different speeds. At 25 miles per hour, it takes you about 62 feet to stop a car. At 35 miles per hour, it takes almost twice as long to stop the car, at 60 mph. 9. Many cough medicines are alcohol based: Correct Answer: A. TrueCorrect!Explanation: You can get a DUI for taking cough medicine, because it contains alcohol. Do you know why they put alcohol in cough medicine? It gets it into your bloodstream fast. That is why they can promise instant relief with a cough syrup. It contains alcohol and it is in your blood in seven seconds. 10. An example of a dangerous passing situation is: Correct Answer: C. All optionsCorrect!Explanation: Never pass in a no passing zone or if there is a line of cars in front of the car you want to pass. Never pass where solid lines exist on the roadway. 11. Alcohol affects the brain centers Correct Answer: B. Not EquallyIncorrect!Explanation: Alcohol affects various centers in the brain, both higher and lower order. The centers are not equally affected by the same B.A.C. - the higher-order centers are more sensitive than the lower-order centers. As the B.A.C. increases, more and more centers of the brain are affected. Each center affected has a different impact on our driving abilities. 12. The road is most slippery: Correct Answer: C. During the first half hour of the rainIncorrect!Explanation: There is dirt, oil and fuel that accumulates, increasing your chances of skidding or hydroplaning, especially during the first half hour of a rainfall. All the fragments of dust, oil, gas, and other kinds of residue dropped by cars and trucks accumulate on the road s surface. The mixture of the rain and these fragments makes it very slippery when driving. So be careful during the first half hour to an hour of rainfall. Try to avoid driving during these periods. 13. The brain plays no role in addiction Correct Answer: B. FalseCorrect!Explanation: It is an all-too-common scenario: A person experiments with an addictive drug. Perhaps they intend to try it just once for "the experience" of it. It turns out, though, that they enjoy the drugs euphoric effect so much that in ensuing weeks and months they use it again -- and again. But in due time, they decide they really should quit. They know that despite the incomparable short-term high they get from using the drug, the long-term consequences of its use are perilous, and vow to stop using. 14. You may lose your license Correct Answer: B. If you accumulate too many points on your driving recordCorrect!Explanation: Point values are assessed to your licenses for moving violations. If you accumulate too many points your license can be suspended. 15. The top excuse for not wearing your seat belt is Correct Answer: A. I am only going a short distance.Correct!Explanation: Did you know that most crashes occur within five miles of your home. So when making trips to and from your house, even in good conditions, remember to use your seat belt. As a matter of fact you should just fasten your seatbelt all the time. That is the safest way! 16. Alcohol affects the Limbic portion of the brain by Correct Answer: C. Exaggerating emotional statesCorrect!Explanation: Limbic System The limbic system controls emotions and memory. As alcohol affects this system, the person is subject to exaggerated states of emotion (anger, aggressiveness, withdrawal) and memory loss. 17. Not all moving violations will appear on your driving record. Your Answer: BCorrect Answer: B. FalseCorrect!Explanation: Every time you are convicted of a traffic violation or are involved in a collision, it's recorded on your driving record. Many states use a point system to identify unsafe drivers, assigning point values for each traffic violation, such as reckless driving, speeding or failing to obey stop signs. 18. If you are being followed by a tailgater, you should change lanes or slow down to encourage them to pass Your Answer: ACorrect Answer: A. TrueCorrect!Explanation: Don't tailgate - Maintain a 2-3 second gap between you and the vehicle in front of you. And if you're on the highway or driving in bad conditions, increase that time to 3 to 5 seconds. Never use tailgating to express your anger or frustration. It's senseless and it puts others at risk. If you're being tailgated, don't take it personally: stay calm, and either slow down or change lanes to let the tailgater pass. Measure your following distance in seconds. 19. At 25 MPH, it will take you about _____ feet to stop your car Your Answer: ACorrect Answer: B. 62Incorrect!Explanation: At 60 miles per hour, the force you produce is 4 times greater than at 30 miles per hour. Consider how much roadway you need to stop your car at different speeds. At 25 miles per hour, it takes you about 62 feet to stop a car. 20. You are allowed to use your vehicle horn: Correct Answer: B. Only when reasonably necessary to prevent a collision.Correct!Explanation: You should only use your horn to warn other drivers or to prevent a crash, not to show how upset you are because you missed your morning coffee. 21. White or Red signs Correct Answer: B. RegulateCorrect!Explanation: Regulatory signs are white or red signs that regulate the flow of traffic and advise the motorists of any laws for that area. 22. Driving a motor vehicle is: Correct Answer: B. A privilege.Correct!Explanation: Remember, the driving privilege is exactly that - a privilege - and if you don't treat it right you may lose it. 23. On a city street you should be looking ahead of you as far ahead as the car in front of you. Your Answer: BCorrect Answer: B. FalseCorrect!Explanation: Aim high." Aim your eyes upward. To aim high means while you are driving down the road look upwards. You almost want to look up into the sky. Try to see at least 10 cars ahead of you. If you Are behind a van, truck or a vehicle with tinted windows, change lanes. It will make a world of difference. 24. Alcohol related crashes cost the public _____. Correct Answer: C. $116 billionCorrect!Explanation: Alcohol-related crashes cost the American public $114 billion annually. About a third of that is monetary costs, and the other two-thirds is quality of life losses. 25. A pedestrian crossing sign is an example of a regulatory sign. Correct Answer: B. FalseCorrect!Explanation: A pedestrian crossing sign is a warning sign. You must yield to pedestrians in the crosswalk. Just ahead is a location where people on foot often cross. The crosswalk may not necessarily be at an intersection. Use caution as you approach and drive more slowly and carefully, watching both sides of the street. 26. Driving a car is similar to: Correct Answer: B. A loaded weaponCorrect!Explanation: Remember if you are an unaware driver or an aggressive driver, your car is like a loaded weapon. You can either choose to point it at somebody, put it back in your pocket, or do not have a loaded gun at all. You must own up to that responsibility. It is a right to own a vehicle, but it is a privilege to drive. 27. If you accumulate _____ points in 12 months your license will be suspended for 30 days. Correct Answer: B. 12Correct!Explanation: The DHSMV may suspend your drivers license if you accumulate: 12 points within 12 months - 30 day suspension 18 points within 18 months - 90 day suspension 24 points within 36 months - One year suspension. 28. It will take approximately _____ for each consumed drink to leave your body: Your Answer: BCorrect Answer: B. One HourCorrect!Explanation: Once alcohol gets into your bloodstream, you cannot kick it out. People think they can. Alcohol, because it is a poison, has to pass through your liver and your kidneys. It has to be cleaned, oxidized, and passed out through urine. That process takes one hour per drink. 29. Each year, over _______ collisions occur. Correct Answer: B. 6 millionCorrect!Explanation: There are over 6 1/2 million collisions on the road every year, one-third of these crashes resulting in an injury or death. 30. A limit line marks the beginning of a intersection Correct Answer: A. TrueCorrect!Explanation: A solid white line crossing found prior to an intersection. This line will cut across the lane of indicating a stopping point. 31. If your license has been suspended, you must do the following to reinstate your license: Correct Answer: C. All of the aboveCorrect!Explanation: If your license has been suspended, you must do the following to reinstate your license: * Serve the period of suspension * Attend any required driver improvement school * Pay any service fee in addition to any fines ordered by court * Show proof of insurance * You also may be required to re-take part of the license test. 32. Your driving may be impaired by: Correct Answer: C. All of the aboveCorrect!Explanation: Although, alcohol maybe the most common drug abused by motorists, there are many other drugs that can affect your ability to drive safely. One example is narcotics, which includes morphine, heroin, and even over-the-counter medications, especially cough syrups with codeine. Even strong emotions can impair your driving abilities. 33. If you are involved in a collision and you do not stop at the scene Correct Answer: B. You are breaking the lawCorrect!Explanation: You must stop - unless you're in the line of oncoming traffic, stop. If you're in the line of oncoming traffic, then pull off onto the nearest shoulder on the road and stop. You are breaking the law if you do not stop at the scene of a crash. 34. Two parallel white lines indicate: Correct Answer: A. A crosswalkIncorrect!Explanation: Two parallel white lines mark a crosswalk for pedestrians. Most of the time you'll find them at intersections where pedestrians can use them when they have a green light or �walk� signal. Remember, pedestrians can be unpredictable and may not cross with the green light, or may not allow themselves enough time to cross before the light turns red. 35. Zero Tolerance Law Means: Correct Answer: C. It is illegal for minors to operate a vehicle after even one drink.Correct!Explanation: Florida has a �zero-tolerance� law for people under 21 years old. Under this law, a minor cannot have any measurable alcohol or other drug in their blood while driving a motor vehicle. If you are under 21 your license will be suspended if you are found driving with a BAC level of .02 or higher. 36. if you are involved in a skid, what should you NEVER do? Correct Answer: C. Lock your brakesCorrect!Explanation: The main thing to remember is: * Never lock your brakes * Ease your foot off the accelerator * Steer in the direction of the skid * Stop when you have regained control of your car. 37. If you start to skid, you should apply a quick pumping motion to your brakes if you have anti-lock brakes. Correct Answer: B. FalseCorrect!Explanation: If you have anti-lock brakes, just press firmly on your brake pedal and the computer will take over. Do not pump the brake pedal. 38. The chances of being involved in an auto collision once a year are: Correct Answer: A. 1 in 25Correct!Explanation: Your chance of being involved in an automobile crash once a year is 1 in 25. 39. If two cars get to a four-way stop intersection at the same time, the car making a left turn should always be given the right of way Correct Answer: B. FalseCorrect!Explanation: At a four-way stop, the car on the left has to yield the right of way to the car on the right. Never insist on it. 40. Warning signs are usually _____-shaped. Correct Answer: C. DiamondIncorrect!Explanation: Did you know that shapes of signs are also indicative of what is ahead? A school zone is in the shape of a schoolhouse. Warning signs are always diamonds.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM JUDICIAL DIRECTIONBy the decision of the Court in Mississippi v. Johnson,724 in 1867, the President was placed beyond the reach of judicial direction, either affirmative or restraining, in the exercise of his powers, whether constitutional or statutory, political or otherwise, save perhaps for what must be a small class of powers that are purely ministerial.725 An application for an injunction to forbid President Johnson to enforce the Reconstruction Acts, on the ground of their unconstitutionality, was answered by Attorney General Stanberg, who argued, inter alia, the absolute immunity of the President from judicial process.726 The Court refused to permit the filing, using language construable as meaning that the President was not reachable by judicial process but which more fully paraded the horrible consequences were the Court to act. First noting the limited meaning of the term "ministerial," the Court observed that "[v]ery different is the duty of the President in the exercise of the power to see that the laws are faithfully executed, and among these laws the acts named in the bill.... The duty thus imposed on the President is in no just sense ministerial. It is purely executive and political."724 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).725 The Court declined to express an opinion "whether, in any case, the President of the United States may be required, by the process of this court, to perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held amenable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime." 71 U.S. at 498. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 825-28 (1992) (Justice Scalia concurring). In NTEU v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court held that a writ of mandamus could issue to compel the President to perform a ministerial act, although it said that if any other officer were available to whom the writ could run it should be applied to him.726 Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 484-85 (1867) (argument of counsel)."An attempt on the part of the judicial department of the government to enforce the performance of such duties by the President might be justly characterized, in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, as 'an absurd and excessive extravagance."'"It is true that in the instance before us the interposition of the court is not sought to enforce action by the Executive under constitutional legislation, but to restrain such action under legislation alleged to be unconstitutional. But we are unable to perceive that this circumstance takes the case out of the general principles which forbid judicial interference with the exercise of Executive discretion.".... ."The Congress is the legislative department of the government; the President is the executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.""The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its possible consequences.""Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court and refuses to execute the acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur between the executive and legislative departments of the government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in that case could this court interfere, in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public world of an attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in that court?"727727 71 U.S. at 499, 500-01. One must be aware that the case was decided in the context of congressional predominance following the Civil War. The Court's restraint was pronounced when it denied an effort to file a bill of injunction to enjoin enforcement of the same acts directed to cabinet officers. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867). Before and since, however, the device to obtain review of the President's actions has been to bring suit against the subordinate officer charged with carrying out the President's wishes. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Congress has not provided process against the President. In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), resolving a long-running dispute, the Court held that the President is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act and his actions, therefore, are not reviewable in suits under the Act. Inasmuch as some agency action, the acts of the Secretary of Commerce in this case, is preliminary to presidential action, the agency action is not "final" for purposes of APA review. Constitutional claims would still be brought, however. See also, following Franklin, Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994).Rare has been the opportunity for the Court to elucidate its opinion in Mississippi v. Johnson, and, in the Watergate tapes case,728 it held the President amenable to subpoena to produce evidence for use in a criminal case without dealing, except obliquely, with its prior opinion. The President's counsel had argued the President was immune to judicial process, claiming "that the independence of the Executive Branch within its own sphere . . . insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential communications."729 However, the Court held, "neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances."730 The primary constitutional duty of the courts "to do justice in criminal prosecutions" was a critical counterbalance to the claim of presidential immunity, and to accept the President's argument would disturb the separation-of-powers function of achieving "a workable government" as well as "gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III."731Present throughout the Watergate crisis, and unresolved by it, was the question of the amenability of the President to criminal prosecution prior to conviction upon impeachment.732 It was argued that the impeachment clause necessarily required indictment and trial in a criminal proceeding to follow a successful impeachment and that a President in any event was uniquely immune from indictment, and these arguments were advanced as one ground to deny enforcement of the subpoenas running to the President.733 Assertion of the same argument by Vice President Agnew was controverted by the Government, through the Solicitor General, but, as to the President, it was argued that for a number of constitutional and practical reasons he was not subject to ordinary criminal process.734728 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).729 418 U.S. at 706.730 Id.731 418 U.S. at 706-07. The issue was considered more fully by the lower courts. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Richard M. Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 6-10 (D.D.C. 1973) (Judge Sirica), aff'd sub nom., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 708-712 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (refusing to find President immune from process). Present throughout was the conflicting assessment of the result of the subpoena of President Jefferson in the Burr trial. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D.Va. 1807). For the history, see Freund, Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 23-30 (1974).732 The impeachment clause, Article I, § 3, cl. 7, provides that the party convicted upon impeachment shall nonetheless be liable to criminal proceedings. Morris in the Convention, 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 500 (rev. ed. 1937), and Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 65, 69 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 442, 463, asserted that criminal trial would follow a successful impeachment.733 Brief for the Respondent, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), 95-122; Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 756-58 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Judge MacKinnon dissenting). The Court had accepted the President's petition to review the propriety of the grand jury's naming him as an unindicted coconspirator, but it dismissed that petition without reaching the question. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687 n.2.734 Memorandum for the United States, Application of Spiro T. Agnew, Civil No. 73-965 (D.Md., filed October 5, 1973).Finally, most recently, the Court has definitively resolved one of the intertwined issues of presidential accountability. The President is absolutely immune in actions for civil damages for all acts within the "outer perimeter" of his official duties.735 The Court's close decision was premised on the President's "unique position in the constitutional scheme," that is, it was derived from the Court's inquiry of a "kind of 'public policy' analysis" of the "policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a system structured to achieve effective government under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers."736 While the Constitution expressly afforded Members of Congress immunity in matters arising from "speech or debate," and while it was silent with respect to presidential immunity, the Court nonetheless considered such immunity "a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history."737 Although the Court relied in part upon its previous practice of finding immunity for officers, such as judges, as to whom the Constitution is silent, although a long common-law history exists, and in part upon historical evidence, which it admitted was fragmentary and ambiguous,738 the Court's principal focus was upon the fact that the President was distinguishable from all other executive officials. He is charged with a long list of "supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity,"739 and diversion of his energies by concerns with private lawsuits would "raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government."740 Moreover, the presidential privilege is rooted in the separation-of-powers doctrine, counseling courts to tread carefully before intruding. Some interests are important enough to require judicial action; "merely private suit[s] for damages based on a President's official acts" do not serve this "broad public interest" necessitating the courts to act.741 Finally, qualified immunity would not adequately protect the President, because judicial inquiry into a functional analysis of his actions would bring with it the evil immunity was to prevent; absolute immunity was required.742735 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).736 457 U.S. at 748.737 457 U.S. at 749.738 457 U.S. at 750-52 n.31.739 457 U.S. at 750.740 457 U.S. at 751.741 457 U.S. at 754.742 457 U.S. at 755-57. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented. The Court reserved decision whether Congress could expressly create a damages action against the President and abrogate the immunity, id. at 748-49 n.27, thus appearing to disclaim that the decision is mandated by the Constitution; Chief Justice Burger disagreed with the implication of this footnote, id. at 763-64 n.7 (concurring opinion), and the dissenters noted their agreement on this point with the Chief Justice. Id. at 770 & n.4.Unofficial ConductIn Clinton v. Jones,743 the Court, in a case of first impression, held that the President did not have qualified immunity from suit for conduct alleged to have taken place prior to his election to the Presidency, which would entitle him to delay of both the trial and discovery. The Court held that its precedents affording the President immunity from suit for his official conduct - primarily on the basis that he should be enabled to perform his duties effectively without fear that a particular decision might give rise to personal liability - were inapplicable in this kind of case. Moreover, the separation-of-powers doctrine did not require a stay of all private actions against the President. Separation of powers is preserved by guarding against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the coequal branches of the Government at the expense of another. However, a federal trial court tending to a civil suit in which the President is a party performs only its judicial function, not a function of another branch. No decision by a trial court could curtail the scope of the President's powers. The trial court, the Supreme Court observed, had sufficient powers to accommodate the President's schedule and his workload, so as not to impede the President's performance of his duties. Finally, the Court stated its belief that allowing such suits to proceed would not generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation. Congress has the power, the Court advised, if it should think necessary to legislate, to afford the President protection.744743 520 U.S. 681 (1997).744 The Court observed at one point that it doubted that defending the suit would much preoccupy the President, that his time and energy would not be much taken up by it. "If the past is any indicator, it seems unlikely that a deluge of such litigation will ever engulf the Presidency." 520 U.S. at 702.The President's SubordinatesWhile the courts may be unable to compel the President to act or to prevent him from acting, his acts, when performed, are in proper cases subject to judicial review and disallowance. Typically, the subordinates through whom he acts may be sued, in a form of legal fiction, to enjoin the commission of acts which might lead to irreparable damage745 or to compel by writ of mandamus the performance of a duty definitely required by law,746 such suits being usually brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.747 In suits under the common law, a subordinate executive officer may be held personally liable in damages for any act done in excess of authority,748 although immunity exists for anything, even malicious wrongdoing, done in the course of his duties.749745 E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (suit to enjoin Secretary of Commerce to return steel mills seized on President's order); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (suit against Secretary of Treasury to nullify presidential orders on Iranian assets). See also Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U.S. 165 (1893); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912).746 E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803) (suit against Secretary of State to compel delivery of commissions of office); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838) (suit against Postmaster General to compel payment of money owed under act of Congress); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840) (suit to compel Secretary of Navy to pay a pension).747 This was originally on the theory that the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia had inherited, via the common law of Maryland, the jurisdiction of the King's Bench "over inferior jurisdictions and officers." Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614, 620-21 (1838). Congress has now authorized federal district courts outside the District of Columbia also to entertain such suits. 76 Stat. 744 (1962), 28 U.S.C. § 1361.748 E.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896).749 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988) (action must be discretionary in nature as well as being within the scope of employment, before federal official is entitled to absolute immunity). Following the Westfall decision, Congress enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the Westfall Act), which authorized the Attorney General to certify that an employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which a suit arose; upon certification, the employee is dismissed from the action, and the United States is substituted, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) then governing the action, which means that sometimes the action must be dismissed against the Government because the FTCA has not waived sovereign immunity. Cognizant of the temptation set before the Government to immunize both itself and its employee, the Court in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995), held that the Attorney General's certification is subject to judicial review.Different rules prevail when such an official is sued for a "constitutional tort" for wrongs allegedly in violation of our basic charter,750 although the Court has hinted that in some "sensitive" areas officials acting in the "outer perimeter" of their duties may be accorded an absolute immunity from liability.751 Jurisdiction to reach such officers for acts for which they can be held responsible must be under the general "federal question" jurisdictional statute, which, as recently amended, requires no jurisdictional amount.752750 An implied cause of action against officers accused of constitutional violations was recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), a Bivens action, the Court distinguished between common-law torts and constitutional torts and denied high federal officials, including cabinet secretaries, absolute immunity, in favor of the qualified immunity previously accorded high state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court denied presidential aides derivative absolute presidential immunity, but it modified the rules of qualified immunity, making it more difficult to hold such aides, other federal officials, and indeed state and local officials, liable for constitutional torts. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the Court extended qualified immunity to the Attorney General for authorizing a warrantless wiretap in a ccase involving domestic national security. Although the Court later held such warrantless wiretaps violated the Fourth Amendment, at the time of the Attorney General's authorization this interpretation was not "clearly established," and the Harlow immunity protected officials exercising discretion on such open questions. See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (in an exceedingly opaque opinion, the Court extended similar qualified immunity to FBI agents who conducted a warrantless search).751 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982).752 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On deleting the jurisdictional amount, see P.L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976), and P.L. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980). If such suits are brought in state courts, they can be removed to federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a).
Yes. There have been studies that have shown that a person who drives when extremely tired is just as dangerous as a person who drives while drunk.
No, weed doesn't impair your ability to drive like alcohol does.
Driving fitness can be impaired by the following: fatigue, ill health, distractions in the vehicle, drugs/alcohol, emotions (anger, sadness, fear).
It depends. If you have one 12-ounce can of beer then yes, it can impair your driving.
If you drink alcohol, it will impair your ability to drive.
true and your judgement.
It depends. Any substance, such as alcohol or drugs, prescription or otherwise, that influence/impair your driving can violate state laws. The idea is that if you are not safe to drive you should not be driving. It's an issue of public safety. If you have something in your system that COULD impair your driving, then the next step is to determine if it DID impair your driving. A few ounces of beer with a meal would probably not influence/impair your driving. As you increase the concentration you make the influence/impairment more likely. Same with drugs. The short answer, low dose, less likely to impair, high dose, more likely to impair.
Fatigue affects reaction time because it can decrease our overall alertness and impair cognitive processing. When we are fatigued, the brain's ability to quickly interpret and respond to stimuli is compromised, leading to slower reaction times. Additionally, fatigue can also slow down physical movements, further contributing to delays in reaction times.
The addition of a new report to complete by Friday will impair my ability to complete all my tasks on time.
The hypothesis of a distracted driver could be that paying attention to a secondary task while driving, such as texting or eating, will not significantly impair their ability to safely operate a vehicle.
Yes. Most definitely.
distraction